

Regularized Learning in Harmonic Games


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Harmonic games and where to find them

Harmonic games

- Conflicting interests
- Strategic center




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- Strategic complement of potential games

$$\Gamma = \Gamma_{\text{pot}} + \Gamma_{\text{harm}}$$




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Dynamics?



In continuous time, players don't learn much

Follow The Regularized Leader

$$\dot{y} = V(x)$$

$$x = Q(y)$$

$$Q(y) = \text{regularized argmax}$$

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
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Theorem

*In continuous time, FTRL in harmonic games is recurrent**

* *Read: quasi-periodic*




Discrete time: optimism in the face of recurrence

Follow The Regularized Leader \dagger

$$y_* = y + \eta \hat{V}$$

$$y_+ = y + \eta V(x_*)$$

$$x = Q(y)$$




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Theorem

In discrete time, FTRL+ in harmonic games converges to a Nash equilibrium, and each player is guaranteed constant regret



Positive convergence result in new class of games. So what?

- Harmonic games **complement potential games** strategically and dynamically
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Thanks!